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Teams that operate in professional sports leagues often display a cyclical pattern in team winning 
percentages that are driven by the payroll choices of owners that are inconsistent with a single, 
stable equilibrium. Two explanations emerge: a stable equilibrium that is shifting over time due 
to shifts of the revenue or payroll function; or moving between two stable equilibriums. We 
employ the Bounds test for cointegration between relative team revenues and payrolls to detect 
multiple equilibria in a sample of Major League Baseball teams over the 1990-2018 seasons. The 
results suggest the possibility of multiple equilibria for five teams even after accounting for 
moves to new stadiums that shift the team revenue function.  
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Armchair sports fans expect to experience the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat with 
their favorite team over a number of games, or perhaps even over a single season. Even very 
talented teams lose occasionally due to injuries, bad weather, poor calls by the umpire, or just bad 
luck. Over a long season, more talented teams tend to win more games, while lesser talented teams 
struggle to eek out victories. Educated sports fans understand the connection between talent and 
winning and that talent comes at a high cost that not all teams can afford. Nevertheless, the 
frustration and disappointment for the fans of losing teams is abated by the hope that there is 
always next season. But not always. Some professional leagues exhibit teams with winning 
percentages that remind one of the booms and busts of the stock market. Consistent middling or 
cellar-dwelling teams experience a change of thinking and “make a run” by quickly acquiring 
expensive talent and dramatically improving their winning percentage for several seasons. 
Ultimately the effort collapses, talent is traded or sold off, and the team returns to its inevitable 
mediocrity. Not all teams display this behavior, but for those that do, we use the term 
“unsustainable run” to describe their sudden rise to glory and ultimate fall to failure.  
MLB is a particularly valid professional league to investigate unsustainable runs since it has 
no salary cap that short circuits the ability to acquire expensive talent quickly. Although the 
competitive balance tax1 (sometimes called the luxury tax) provides some disincentive to ramp up 
the team payroll, it is only paid by the very few richest teams in MLB and is mostly viewed by 
them as a cost of doing business. The MLB revenue sharing plan could provide teams with some 
disincentive to make a run since a portion of the local team revenue (48%) is shared with all of the 
 
1 The competitive balance tax is paid as a percentage of the overage of the team payroll above a threshold level that 
is set in the league collective bargaining agreement. The threshold was $206 million for the 2019 season. Only the 
New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs exceeded the threshold. 
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other 29 teams in the league, lowering the return to the team making a run. The National Football 
League (NFL), National Hockey League (NHL), National Basketball Association (NBA) and 
Major League Soccer (MLS) all utilize a salary cap system and extensive revenue sharing that 
reduces the incidence of unsustainable runs, although not eliminating them.2 
Rockerbie and Easton (2013, 2010) construct a model of two-team professional sports league 
that can generate two equilibriums, regardless of whether the team owners are profit-maximizers 
or win-maximizers. Multiple equilibria can be the result of spillover effects on league revenue 
from talent acquisitions by individual teams. The result of the extensive revenue sharing of both 
local and national revenues is an upward-sloping section of the marginal revenue product schedule 
when team owners acquire more talent. The standard two-team league diagram is provided in 
Figure 1 with team winning percentage on the horizontal axis. Winning percentage for each team 
is determined by the Tullock function 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 (𝑡1 + 𝑡2)⁄  where t is the stock of team talent. Three 
profit-maximizing equilibria are demonstrated with the middle equilibrium being unstable. Swings 
between the two stable equilibriums can occur due to a number of events, such as a change in team 
ownership, a change in management philosophy, an anticipation of higher or lower local and 
national revenues that does not materialize, or irrational exuberance. It could also be the case that 
factors that shift the marginal revenue product schedules give the appearance of an unsustainable 
run, but are merely the movement from a single, stable equilibrium to a new one. These could be 
the result of a new local or national media contract, a new stadium, or demographic shifts in the 
local metropolitan area. 
 
2 The NBA collective bargaining agreement contains many exemptions to the team salary cap that allow some teams 
to exceed the salary cap by a wide margin.  
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A small number of MLB teams appear to start, be in the middle of, or just ending, an 
unsustainable run every season. Their hopes of championship glory are always dashed by 
mounting financial losses, resulting in a return to mediocrity on the field. Profit-maximizing team 
owners should not behave this way, particularly if they are risk-averse. Ignoring a sudden change 
in an owner’s utility function, economics predicts a rapid increase in payroll only when the local 
market size increases just as rapidly, but it cannot explain the inevitable plummet in payroll that 
follows. Some economists argue that team owners are win-maximizers that are satisfied to just 
break even financially, but this argument still cannot explain the downward swing in payroll that 
ends a run. Perhaps teams are subject to talent cycles – bringing talented players to the major 
league club in “lumps” and then trading or releasing them when they become too expensive to 
keep. Surely a profit-maximizing owner could understand the nature of these talent cycles and 
smooth them out with the careful drafting and development of young talent. Some teams are quite 
successful doing this and are consistent talent producers (Yankees, Dodgers, Red Sox, etc.), while 
others develop talented young players to trade or sell before they become expensive (Athletics, 
Mariners, Rays, Royals, etc.) so the major league club is consistently mediocre on the field, but at 
least consistent. Both types of club deal with smoothing talent cycles, just in different ways.  
2. STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF UNSUSTAINABLE RUNS 
We provide suggestive evidence of unsustainable runs by performing a non-parametric runs 
test on the winning percentages of MLB clubs over the period 1962-2019.3 The null hypothesis of 
the Wald-Wolfowitz runs test is that the winning percentages are generated by a random process. 
The critical cut-off winning percentage to identify a run is 0.499, as some clubs experienced 
 
3 These winning percentages are taken from http://www.baseball-reference.com/. 
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winning percentages of 0.5 at the end of a season necessitating excluding the observation. The 
results are summarized in Table 1. 
Rejecting a random process for winning percentages based on the runs test does not identify 
what type of process is generating the winning percentages. To provide some further insight, we 
estimated a first-order autoregressive model for winning percentages that forced an intercept of 
0.500. The estimated slope coefficient and Breusch-Godfrey F statistic value (for first-order serial 
correlation) appear in the last two columns of Table 1. The Breusch-Godfrey test suggests evidence 
of a higher-order autocorrelation process if its null hypothesis is rejected. 
The results of the runs test suggest that there is a non-random pattern for club winning 
percentages, with the exceptions of the Anaheim Angels, Chicago Cubs, Colorado Rockies, 
Kansas City Royals, Miami Marlins, Minnesota Twins, Seattle Mariners, and Texas Rangers. Just 
what is the process generating unsustainable runs is suggested by the slope coefficient for the 
AR(1) model (with an intercept of 0.500), which is positive and statistically significant at 95% 
confidence for all MLB clubs, with the exception of the Arizona Diamondbacks. The results of the 
Breusch-Godfrey test suggest that a higher order autoregressive process is determining winning 
percentages for the Dodgers, Cardinals, Mariners, Rangers, and Red Sox. One can interpret these 
results as suggesting that almost all MLB clubs display cyclical behavior, but for those that fail 
the runs test, the cycles are short. The clubs that are most characterized by unsustainable runs in 
winning percentage could be the Atlanta Braves, Baltimore Orioles, Houston Astros, New York 
Mets, New York Yankees, and Tampa Bay Rays based on the magnitude of their AR(1) coefficient 
and runs test. 
3. SOME THEORY 
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The standard two-team league models used in sports economics (Kesenne (2000, 2015)) 
cannot generate unsustainable runs. The league distribution of talent is optimal and constant unless 
there is a change in relative market sizes or some other unspecified exogenous variable. An 
unsustainable run would be a movement of one team away from its profit-maximizing equilibrium 
stock of talent and would quickly be corrected in the absence of constraints on player movement. 
League welfare would be reduced since the positive unsustainable run of one team affects all its 
opposing teams in a negative fashion and league profitability would fall. Unsustainable runs are 
frequent enough that they cannot just be a miscalculation by a team owner. 
Rockerbie and Easton (2010, 2013) demonstrate that an unsustainable run cannot be the 
result of a two-team league model with a single equilibrium, regardless of whether the team owner 
is a profit-maximizer or a win-maximizer and regardless of revenue sharing and team salary caps. 
They argue that an unsustainable run can be the result of two equilibrium talent stocks, one low 
and one high, that result in corresponding low and high winning percentages.  
The model relies on the presence of a variable returns to scale production technology at the 
league level. Although individual teams produce their output (wins) with decreasing returns to 
scale (arising from the diminishing marginal product of talent), league output in terms of revenue 
is produced with increasing returns to scale in talent. Spillover effects are generated when one 
team acquires talented players whose revenue contribution to the league outweighs their 
diminishing marginal revenue product for their own team. Since national revenues (broadcasting, 
media, apparel, etc.) are shared equally among all teams under the MLB revenue sharing system, 
the marginal revenue product schedule for a small market team could reach a minimum and then 
slope upward at a high stock of its own talent due to the revenue sharing arrangement that rewards 
its own talent stock with higher league revenues. This is less likely for large market teams since 
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the national revenues received are a small percentage of their team total revenue. The S-shaped 
marginal revenue product schedule in Figure 1 may result in a low and high talent equilibrium for 
a small market team, the middle portion being unstable. What is not known is what factors 
incentivize a team owner to “run” from a low to high equilibrium, then back again. What the model 
does suggest is that the equilibrium at point B in Figure 1 could occur at a winning percentage 
close to 0.500 and that clubs would not stay at point B season after season. 
A little algebra gives some insights into the connection between the team payroll and team 
revenue at a talent equilibrium. This is essential in order to motivate the time series methods that 
follow in the next section. Assume that, in a two-team league, the revenue of team 1 is given by 𝑅1 = 𝑅1(𝑤1, 𝑋1) = 𝐴𝑤1𝑋𝑖 where 𝑤1 is the team winning percentage and 𝑋1 is a vector of shift 
variables that can be local or league wide and each is assumed to have the same marginal effect on 
revenue. The team owner chooses a stock of talent that “produces” a winning percentage from the 
Tullock function 𝑤1 = 𝑡1 (𝑡1 + 𝑡2)⁄ . The concavity of the production function ensures that the 
revenue function displays diminishing marginal revenue in talent. The team owner establishes a 
monetary budget, 𝐵1, to acquire costly talent. The exogenous marginal cost of talent (the wage rate 
per unit of talent) is 𝑧 thus we have 𝑧𝑡1 = 𝐵1.4 The team owner maximizes profit with respect to 
the team talent stock when 𝑑𝑅𝑖 𝑑𝑡𝑖⁄ = 𝑧. Stability of the equilibrium requires that 𝑑𝑅𝑖 𝑑𝑡𝑖⁄ < 𝑧 
with an increase in the team talent stock (𝑑2𝑅𝑖 𝑑𝑡𝑖2⁄ < 0), or, with some manipulation, that the 
 
4 Differences in the marginal cost of talent among teams are a possibility, but not typically assumed in the 
literature since the entire league is thought of as a monopsony, not individual teams. However, the results that follow 
rely critically on this assumption. Rockerbie and Easton (2019) specify a relationship between the team budget and 
the team stock of talent that incorporates the openness of the league talent market. We abstract from that relationship 




elasticity of revenue with respect to talent is less than the share of the team payroll budget, 𝑧𝑡𝑖, in 
total revenue (𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑅𝑖 𝑅𝑖𝑑𝑡𝑖⁄ < 𝑧𝑡𝑖 𝑅𝑖⁄ ).  
The first-order condition from the maximization problem is 
𝐴(𝑡2 (𝑡1 + 𝑡2)2⁄ )𝑋1 − 𝑧 = 0        (1) 
The condition in (1) can be solved for the profit-maximizing talent stock and the resulting indirect 
budget and revenue functions, 𝐵1∗ = 𝑧𝑡1∗ and 𝑅1∗ = 𝐴𝑤1∗𝑋1. 
𝑡1∗ = (𝐴𝑋1𝑡2 𝑧⁄ )0.5 − 𝑡2         (2) 
Exogenous factors contained in 𝑋1 shift the revenue and budget functions to move to a new 
profit-maximizing equilibrium, although the shifts may differ in magnitude. Nevertheless, team 
revenue and payroll (budget) move in the same direction in a stable and predictable way in reaction 
to exogenous shocks, whether anticipated or not. Changes in the marginal cost of talent shift the 
payroll function to move along the revenue function in the same direction to a new equilibrium. 
Team 1 will increase its talent stock and payroll in reaction to an increase in team 2’s talent stock 
providing 𝑡2 < 𝐴𝑋1 2⁄ . The important point is that team revenue and payroll should be strongly 
associated and not drift apart – that is they should be cointegrated in the language of time series 
analysis.  
4. TIME-SERIES METHODS 
Testing for the presence of multiple equilibria is difficult using structural regression models 
due to the identification problem. It could be the case that more than one equilibrium exists, but if 
there is no movement to the other equilibrium, it cannot be observed with sample data.5 Therefore, 
 
5 Berthelemy (2006) applies a Hodrick-Prescott filter to real per capita GDP time-series data for a number of suspect 
countries in an attempt to identify multiple equilibrium growth rates with some success. Firms in the same market 
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tests for multiple equilibria have relied upon estimating the time-series properties of the variable(s) 
being considered, usually employing unit-root tests that incorporate known structural breaks. 
Davis and Weinstein (2002) test for the presence of multiple equilibria in the growth paths of 
Japanese cities subjected to bombing in World War II. The dropping of the atom bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki (and conventional allied bombing on other Japanese cities) introduced 
large, negative shocks to their growth paths. A rapid return to their pre-bombing growth paths 
suggests a temporary movement below a single, stable equilibrium, while a permanent change in 
their growth paths suggests a movement to a second equilibrium. The test requires holding constant 
control variables that could have shifted the growth paths of these cities to create a new, stable, 
single equilibrium. Davis and Weinstein (2002) employed a unit-root test and determined the 
shock to be temporary, thereby finding no evidence for multiple equilibria. 
Bosker et al (2007) apply the time-series methods of Davis and Weinstein (2002) to German 
cities bombed during World War II to test for multiple equilibria, with an important innovation – 
the incorporation of spatial interdependence. Multiple equilibria can be generated when large 
spillover effects occur between cities (or teams in our case). Without the allowance for these 
effects, the Davis and Weinstein (2002) method will have difficulty identifying multiple equilibria. 
Bosker et (2007) do find evidence for two stable equilibrium growth paths for German cities on 
the basis of unit-root tests. 
A single long-run equilibrium can be detected using cointegration methods. In our case, a 
run to a second equilibrium requires the rapid accumulation (or releasing) of talent to improve the 
team winning percentage. A hefty increase in team payroll could be followed by an increase in 
 
clustering their outputs at different positions could be evidence of multiple equilibria. Sweeting (2009) tests this 
hypothesis for radio stations by noting if commercials are clustered at various times in the day and finds evidence in 
favor of multiple equilibria. 
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team revenue and a new, local profit maximum is reached. Team revenue and payroll then form a 
cointegrating regression model if both series are trend-stationary ((I(0)), that is, stationary in 
variance so that they do not drift apart over time. Stationarity is tested using the Ng-Perron (NP) 
test as it has higher power when facing small sample sizes. The NP test first de-trends the data 
using the method in Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) to remove any trend and drift 
components, then estimates a Dickey-Fuller (DF) regression of the form below (where the 
superscript d denotes de-trended data). 
∆𝑦𝑡𝑑 = 𝛽𝑦𝑡−1𝑑 + 𝑒𝑡         (3) 
The t-statistic for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is calculated using the 
Phillips and Perron (1988) method and compared to tabled values contained in Ng and Perron 
(2001). Rejection of the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽 = 0 suggests that the series is trend-stationary.  
We chose to model relative team revenue as the dependent variable since team revenues are 
accumulated over a season while team payrolls are determined at the start of the season. Team 
owners likely base their payroll decisions on an expectation of the subsequent season revenue. If 
their expectations are correct on the average, our approach is appropriate. In addition, revenue and 
payroll should move in the same direction when affected by local (local media, demographics, 
income, stadium, etc.) and league wide shocks (national media, apparel, licensing contracts, 
changes to the revenue sharing plan, etc.) eliminating the need to include other control variables 
in the cointegrating regression and stripping the error term of these shocks that would normally 
require breakpoint methods. 
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We first conduct the NP test on relative team revenue and relative team payroll for each of 
the 28 MLB teams in our sample (1990-2018) to determine the order of stationarity.6 Visual 
inspection of these series for each team strongly suggested that the trend component could be 
excluded and only the drift term included. A finding that team revenue and payroll are both I(0) is 
evidence in favor of a single, stable equilibrium association between the two and no further testing 
is required.  
If the two time-series are both difference-stationary (I(1)), an Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test can be applied to the residuals of the cointegrating regression of relative team revenue 
and relative team payroll. Failing to reject a unit root suggests that the two time-series are not 
cointegrated and a long-run equilibrium does not exist. This finding, combined with graphical 
inspection of the team revenue and team payroll to detect runs, could be evidence in favor of two 
equilibriums. A number of teams displayed results suggesting that relative team revenue and 
relative team payroll are stationary of different orders.7 Fortunately, the Bounds test of Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (PSS, 2001) we use is not sensitive to the order of differencing of the variables as 
long as they are either I(0) or I(1). The method first estimates an ARDL model in the form of a 
VAR(p) model in (4) below that includes an error correction term below where y = relative team 
revenue, x = relative team payroll, t = time trend, and L is the lag-difference operator. 
𝜑(𝐿)(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡 − 𝛼 − 𝛾𝑡)        (4) 
 
6 Forbes estimates of annual revenue and opening day payrolls were obtained from Rod Fort’s online database that 
can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/rodswebpages/codes. We chose to not deflate the data as team owners 
are thought to make their business decisions based on figures and ratio analysis from annual financial statements that 
report nominal figures. While it is true that time-series analysis for macroeconomic data typically focuses on the 
best estimates of real variables, decisions at the firm level rely on nominal firm financial data.  
7 This was the case for the Boston Red Sox, Chicago White Sox, Los Angeles Dodgers, Milwaukee Brewers, New 
York Yankees, Oakland Athletics, Seattle Mariners and Texas Rangers. 
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After estimation of (4), the Bounds test tests the restriction that the coefficient of the error 
correction term and those for the lagged independent variable (in levels and differences) are equal 
to zero. Rejection of the null hypothesis from an F-statistic is evidence in favor of a cointegrated 
association. Critical Bounds for the F-statistic at various levels of confidence are provided in PSS 
(2001).  
Although failing to reject the null hypothesis in the Bounds test is not definitive evidence 
for more than one equilibrium, the combination of finding difference-stationary series and a lack 
of cointegration suggests that both relative team revenue and relative team payroll are dominated 
by permanent shocks that do not appear to return to a single equilibrium. Economic theory suggests 
that team payroll and revenue are connected by profit-maximization, thus permanent shocks that 
affect both variables should move them together to a new profit-maximizing position – potentially 
a second equilibrium 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Bounds test for cointegration does not require the separate computations of unit-root 
tests on team revenue and payroll, however we present them for analysis in Table 2 in addition to 
the Bounds test. We included an intercept but no trend variable in the NP unit-root test since 
relative team revenue and relative team payroll were not centered around zero (nor their first 
differences) and a discernible upward trend was not found in most cases. An exact p-value for the 
reported F-statistic from the Bounds test cannot be computed since its distribution is not well-
known. Instead, it is compared to upper and lower critical values found in PSS (2001) and the 
decision is reported in Table 2.  
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The null hypothesis of a unit root in relative team revenue could not be rejected at 95% 
confidence using the NP test in 16 out of 28 teams. Shocks to relative team revenue have 
persistence for these teams while temporary shocks are characteristic of the others. A unit root in 
relative team payroll could not be rejected at 95% confidence in 20 of 28 teams. Shocks to relative 
team payrolls also have persistence, suggesting that these 20 team owners made very conscious 
policy shifts in relative team payroll, while the other teams that display trend-stationary shocks 
returned to the same payroll policy after brief spells of movement.  
Although team revenue and payroll may share the same order of stationarity, their 
cointegrating regression may perform poorly if it is not properly specified. Stationarity of the same 
order is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a long-run association. Subsequently, the 
Bounds test was computed for each of the 28 teams. Eight teams failed the Bounds test at 95% 
confidence, five of which made runs to World Series appearances only to reduce their team 
payrolls significantly in subsequent seasons, while the other two made short-lived playoff runs.8 
Each of these teams displayed unit roots in relative team payroll, with the exception of the San 
Diego Padres. Our results suggest that these episodes were not merely a movement around a single 
stable equilibrium, but rather a movement to a second, albeit short-lived and lower profit, stable 
equilibrium.  
Significant events could have shifted the team revenue function and marginal revenue, 
resulting in a profit-maximizing change in the team payroll to a new equilibrium team winning 
percentage, giving the illusion of two equilibria when in fact it is not the case. Testing for a 
 
8 World Series appearances followed by large payroll reductions included the Chicago Cubs (2016), Kansas City 
Royals (2015, 2014), Philadelphia Phillies (2009, 2008), San Diego Padres (1998), and San Francisco Giants (2010, 
2002). The Baltimore Orioles (1997, 1996) and Texas Rangers (2016, 2011) made playoff runs and appeared in the 
American League Championship Series. 
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cointegrating association between relative team revenue and payroll incorporating a breakpoint at 
the event, if known, would reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The existence of a 
breakpoint in a time series reduces the power of standard unit root tests so that rejection of the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is less likely (Gregory and Hansen, 1996). In our case a unit root in 
relative team revenue and payroll could not be rejected for a majority of the MLB teams in our 
sample, suggesting that structural breaks could be a problem.  
The new stadium effect likely shifted the revenue function for a short period, the so-called 
“honeymoon effect” noted by Coffin (1996) and Coates and Humphreys (2005), resulting in an 
increase in payroll to maximize profit. To hold this effect constant, we included a dummy variable 
for the first year of a new stadium and found the best fitting lag length up to a maximum of five 
seasons for the stadium effect in the ARDL model for relative team revenue.9 This is consistent 
with the findings of Coates and Humphreys (2005) of a honeymoon of no more than five seasons 
following the move to a new stadium.10 The Bounds test was computed for teams that rejected a 
cointegrating relationship between relative team revenue and payroll without accounting for the 
stadium effect.11 These results appear in the last column in Table 2. Many teams displayed a 
cointegrated association despite moving into new stadiums at some point in the sample period, 
eliminating the need to perform further cointegration tests. Cointegration was rejected for the 
Chicago Cubs, Chicago White Sox, Cleveland Indians, Los Angeles Dodgers, Philadelphia 
Phillies, San Francisco Giants and Texas Rangers.  
 
9 Specifically, a dummy variable for a new stadium was applied to the intercept, trend interaction and interaction 
with relative payroll. 
10 In all cases, the lag length that maximized the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was less than five seasons, 
suggesting a relative short honeymoon effect on relative team revenue. 





The cointegration test results in Table 2 deserve some graphical analysis for the teams who 
appear to be good candidates for unsustainable runs. We present only four for the sake of brevity, 
however all eight teams display similar behavior. These can be compared to a team that is 
representative of a cointegrated association between relative team revenue and payroll, the 
Oakland Athletics.  
The Philadelphia Phillies suffered through a decade of mediocrity in the 1990’s, only moving 
above a 0.500 winning percentage in 1993. Relative team revenue and payroll consistently fell 
below the MLB median in Figure 2, moving roughly in step with each other. The team was sold 
in 1997 to David Montgomery, however any change in management philosophy was not 
immediately apparent. The 2002 season saw a jump in relative team payroll that continued until 
the 2004 season where it peaked at 142.7%. Relative team revenue increased in step, but more 
slowly, hence the team experienced operating losses. The team moved to the new Citizens Bank 
Park for the 2004 season with little effect on revenue and payroll, both falling back to the MLB 
median by 2007, although the Phillies appeared in the World Series in 2008, more by luck than 
effort. Drastic payroll cuts move the relative team payroll to just 72.6% by 2018. The correlation 
coefficient for the 1990-2018 seasons is 0.611, but only 0.324 for the 2008-2018 seasons. Although 
the Phillies experienced success on the field for a short period (2005-12), the run to position C in 
Figure 1 was not sustainable from a profit standpoint and the team has slipped back to mediocrity 
since the 2011 season. 
The Chicago White Sox enjoyed success on the field in the 1990’s fueled by a large increase 
in relative payroll in Figure 3, peaking at 141% in 1997, and an increase in relative revenue to 
153% in 1992, partly spurred by the move to the New Comiskey Park in 1994 (now U.S. Cellular 
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Field). The team made playoff appearances in 1993 and 2000, but in the end, these runs were not 
sustainable. Relative team revenue and payroll rapidly fell to just below the MLB median in 1998 
and continued to decline to historical lows for the 1999 season. The White Sox won the World 
Series in the 2005 season, then quickly fell back to an also-ran team with relative team revenue 
falling well short of payroll. The correlation coefficient over the 1990-2018 seasons is just 0.273. 
An ownership change is not an explanation for the cyclical behavior as the club was owned by 
Jerry Reinsdorf over the entire sample period. The high and low equilibria model in Figure 1 is a 
good fit for the White Sox. 
Relative revenue and payroll are only weakly associated for the Texas Rangers in Figure 4 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.334. The Rangers are the best example for unsustainable runs 
among all 28 MLB teams sampled. The new Rangers Ballpark was opened for the 1994 season 
and relative revenue increased modestly for the two subsequent seasons, meandering back to the 
MLB median thereafter. The club was sold to Tom Hicks in 1998. Hicks began an aggressive 
increase in team payroll to turn the club into a winner, but the gamble did not pay off. Relative 
payroll increased dramatically, far outstripping the growth in relative revenue, resulting in 
financial losses that persisted until the 2004 season.12 The team winning percentage cycled 
annually from good to bad most erratically, so much so, that it deserves display in Figure 5. Poor 
on-field performance did not hurt the bottom line from 2004 to 2011 as the Rangers were profitable 
The club was sold again in 2010 to a group of investors (Rangers Baseball Express) who increased 
relative payroll significantly starting in the 2011 season, but relative revenues did not keep pace. 
 
12 A large portion of the relative payroll increase was the MLB record $250 million 10-year contract paid to 
shortstop Alex Rodriguez. 
18 
 
The run ended in the 2018 season. The lack of cointegration suggested by the Bounds test in Table 
2 is not surprising for the Rangers. 
The Cleveland Indians signed John Hart as the new General Manager to begin the 1992 
season. Hart built the team into a contender with a series of trades and free agent signings that 
increased the team payroll from a low of 27.5% of the MLB median payroll to a peak of 160% for 
the 1999 season in Figure 6. Revenue benefited from World Series appearances in 1995 and 1997 
and the move into the new Jacobs Field (now Progressive Field) at the start of the 1994 season. 
The next four seasons saw team revenue rise in step with the team payroll, peaking at 175% of the 
league median revenue in the 1998 season. The team’s performance fell off after the 1998 season 
resulting in a drop in payroll as the Hart shed expensive players and a drop in revenue. Team owner 
Richard Jacobs sold the club to Larry Dolan in 2001, who brought in a more conservative, cost-
conscious management strategy. Since 2002, Cleveland’s relative revenue and payroll have moved 
in close step with a correlation coefficient of 0.88, resulting in modest profitability. The Bounds 
test in Table 2 strongly suggests that relative team revenue and payroll are not cointegrated with 
persistent shocks impacting both.  
Walter Haas purchased the Oakland Athletics from Charlie Finley in 1981 and immediately 
began to build a World Series contender, increasing the payroll and bringing in a new management 
team. The A’s made a World Series appearance in 1989, but the team payroll dropped in 
subsequent seasons as did the team’s on-field performance. Haas sold the team in 1995 and the 
team was sold again in 2005. Relatively turbulent ownership has not changed the team philosophy 
that recognizes the relatively small size of its local market and adopts a careful business plan that 
does not feature unsustainable runs. The team has displayed a very consistent association between 
relative team revenue and payroll in Figure 7, usually below the league median values. The 
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correlation coefficient between relative team revenue and payroll is strong at 0.877 over the 1990-
2018 sample period. This consistency is quite typical of MLB teams that share a cointegrating 
association between relative team revenue and payroll, although the A’s have one of the smaller 
variances between the two.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper notes the rather odd cyclical pattern of winning and losing that is characteristic 
of many MLB teams. Other research has argued that cyclical variation of winning percentages and 
the odd disassociation between team revenues and payrolls is not consistent with profit 
maximization or win maximization and could be the result of multiple equilibria (Rockerbie and 
Easton, 2010, 2013). Economic development and macroeconomics research have also developed 
theoretical models where multiple equilibria can arise, but they have also demonstrated that 
empirically testing from multiple equilibria is difficult and inconclusive. Conclusive tests are not 
available, instead the researcher must rely upon indirect evidence.  
Recent developments in the time series literature have provided methods to find additional 
evidence. Cointegration of relative team revenue and payroll (via the Bounds test) is suggestive of 
a long run association, lending support to a single, stable profit maximizing equilibrium that can 
shift over time due to changes in factors that shift the team revenue or payroll function, perhaps 
giving the illusion of multiple equilibria. We include an intervention variable for new stadiums 
that could provide the impetus for such shifts, but still find eight MLB teams that do not share a 
cointegrating association. A lack of cointegration is suggestive of multiple equilibria but is not 
definitive proof. However, the odd behaviors of relative team revenue and payroll for these teams 
cannot be explained by the standard profit maximizing (or win maximizing) team model, unless 
one resorts to irrational exuberance or some other owner objective as an explanation – poor ones 
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at that. The upshot is that the large spillover effects from team talent acquisitions due to revenue 
sharing plans (both local and national revenues) that exist in professional sports leagues can create 
considerable instability in the profit maximizing decisions of team owners when multiple 
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Runs Test, AR(1) Slope and Breusch-Godfrey Test Results for MLB Club Winning Percentages, 
1962-2019. 
 
MLB Club Seasons Runs Expected Runs P-Value AR(1) slope B-G Test 
Anaheim Angels 58 32 29.9 0.718 0.151 0.180 
Atlanta Braves 58 17 37.3 0.001 0.729* 1.385 
Arizona Diamondbacks 22 8 14.9 0.001 -0.005 1.371 
Baltimore Orioles 58 13 36.3 0.001 0.653* 0.134 
Boston Red Sox 58 14 48.0 0.001 0.452* 3.500* 
Chicago Cubs 58 24 26.7 0.234 0.296* 0.265 
Chicago White Sox 58 22 29.9 0.018 0.304* 0.692 
Cincinnati Reds 58 20 35.2 0.012 0.429* 2.164 
Cleveland Indians 58 18 26.7 0.009 0.423* 2.242 
Colorado Rockies 27 11 10.6 0.577 0.434* 0.052 
Detroit Tigers 58 18 35.2 0.001 0.538* 0.139 
Houston Astros 58 22 36.3 0.003 0.620* 0.207 
Kansas City Royals 51 21 24.5 0.161 0.581* 2.567 
Los Angeles Dodgers 58 21 50.2 0.001 0.444* 4.721* 
Miami Marlins 27 7 7.4 0.149 0.486* 0.197 
Milwaukee Brewers1 50 16 30.9 0.001 0.530* 0.803 
Minnesota Twins 58 27 32.0 0.093 0.366* 1.040 
New York Mets 58 14 28.8 0.001 0.645* 0.043 
New York Yankees 58 11 52.3 0.001 0.795* 0.172 
Oakland Athletics2 58 14 34.1 0.001 0.578* 0.385 
Philadelphia Phillies 58 14 32.0 0.001 0.602* 0.486 
Pittsburgh Pirates 58 18 27.7 0.008 0.605* 0.159 
San Diego Padres 52 17 18.1 0.241 0.489* 1.417 
San Francisco Giants 58 18 38.4 0.001 0.337* 0.198 
Seattle Mariners 43 18 16.0 0.771 0.405* 4.475* 
St. Louis Cardinals 58 29 47.0 0.001 0.337* 3.972* 
Tampa Bay Rays 22 4 9.55 0.001 0.697* 0.148 
Texas Rangers3 58 25 25.6 0.435 0.438* 3.253* 
Toronto Blue Jays 43 13 25.6 0.001 0.609* 0.335 
Washington Nationals4 53 16 27.7 0.001 0.451* 1.353 
 
1Relocated from Seattle in 1971. 
2Relocated from Kansas City in 1967. 
3Relocated from Washington in 1971. 






Unit-Root tests and Bounds Test Results for MLB Club Relative Team Revenue and Payroll, 
1990-2018. 
 
















Anaheim Angels 29 1999 -4.531 -5.762 12.182*  
Atlanta Braves 29 1997 -3.538 -3.583 5.708 31.887* 
Arizona Diamondbacks 21  -1.590 -6.816 5.049  
Baltimore Orioles 29 1992 -4.210 -5.309 5.501 12.488* 
Boston Red Sox 29  -14.441* -2.738 14.314*  
Chicago Cubs 29  -4.254 -7.677 1.568  
Chicago White Sox 29 1991 -6.260 -10.675* 1.623 3.369 
Cincinnati Reds 29 2000 -13.911* -11.367* 40.573*  
Cleveland Indians 29 1994 -7.779 -6.113 7.932a 2.693 
Colorado Rockies 26  -3.416 -3.355 6.928  
Detroit Tigers 29 2000 -6.962 -5.388 8.105a 6.252* 
Houston Astros 29 2000 -7.060 -8.037 12.543*  
Kansas City Royals 29 2010 -2.297 -5.282 2.162 6.864* 
Los Angeles Dodgers 29  -160.466* -6.480 1.220  
Miami Marlins 26 2012 -8.564* -11.199* 18.279*  
Milwaukee Brewers 29 2001 -42.901* -7.528 111.241*  
Minnesota Twins 29 2010 -5.274 -7.142 15.645*  
New York Mets 29 2009 -20.044* -18.734* 26.046*  
New York Yankees 29 2009 -23.399* -2.582 24.654*  
Oakland Athletics 29 1995 -19.538* -5.569 112.300*  
Philadelphia Phillies 29 2004 -3.576 -3.560 3.022 3.126 
Pittsburgh Pirates 29 2001 -8.552* -8.736* 34.230*  
San Diego Padres 29 2000 -9.322* -10.384* 11.262*  
San Francisco Giants 29 2000 -2.780 -6.971 4.898 3.559 
Seattle Mariners 29 1999 -2.964 -8.543* 5.942 9.888* 
St. Louis Cardinals 29 2004 -23.986* -14.430* 14.589*  
Tampa Bay Rays 21  -3.875 -7.675 20.041*  
Texas Rangers 29 1994 -9.625* -7.887 6.711 4.835a 
 
1An asterisk denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit-root at 95% confidence. 
2An asterisk denotes rejection of the null hypothesis on no cointegration at 95% confidence. 
















Philadelphia Phillies Relative Team Revenue and Payroll, 1990-2018. 
 
 





































































































































Chicago White Sox relative team revenue and payroll, 1990-2018. 
 
 



































































































































Texas Rangers relative team revenue and payroll, 1990-2018. 
 
 



































































































































FIGURE 5  
Texas Rangers winning percentage, 1990-2018. 
 
 













































































































































FIGURE 6  
Cleveland Indians relative team revenue and payroll, 1990-2018. 
 
 




































































































































FIGURE 7  
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